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Ethnocentrism in Present Germany: Some Correlations with Social Integration and Subjective Assessments

by Michael Terwey

Zusammenfassung:

*Arbeiten von **Durkheim** über Religion und soziale Integration werden als ein Ansatz für die Analyse von Ethnozentrismus in Deutschland verwendet. Dementsprechend ist eine relativ weite, funktionale Definition des Religiösen einzusetzen. Jede Religion enthält Elemente, welche den engeren Kreis offensichtlich religiöser Institutionen überschreiten. Aktive Integration in soziale Gruppen und Identifikation mit ihren Idealen beeinflussen stark die Identitätsfindungen und Einstellungen von Individuen. Die nachfolgenden empirischen Untersuchungen versuchen, Antworten auf verschiedene Fragen zu geben. Sind die unterschiedlichen Stärken von Ethnozentrismus, die sich zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland feststellen lassen, in Verbindung zu sehen mit den stark differierenden Graden kirchlicher Bindung? Inwieweit stehen politische Linksorientierungen in Verbindung mit der Akzeptanz von Minoritäten? Sind es subjektive ökonomische Unzufriedenheiten, welche das gegenwärtige Ausmaß der ethnischen Intoleranz allgemein bestimmen? Zusätzliche Aufmerksamkeit gilt den "Postmaterialisten", deren Wunschhaltungen auch eine Prioritätssetzung auf die "multikulturelle Gesellschaft" beinhalten mag. Einige Untersuchungsergebnisse deuten auf eine besondere Bedeutung vager Befürchtungen und sozialer Pessimismen für die unterschiedliche Ausbreitung von Ethnozentrismus hin.*

Abstract:

*The work of **Durkheim** about social integration and elementary forms of religious life is taken as a major starting point for the analysis of ethnocentrism in Germany. His functional conception of the religious is not narrowly oriented as in some theories of contemporary sociologists. Every religion contains parts by which it overlaps the circle of obviously religious institutions. Active integration into social groups and identification with their special ideals shape identities and attitudes of individual men. Our empirical investigations deal with several questions. Are the differences in ethnocentrism which we find for*

East- and West Germany explained by differing attachments to Christian churches? To what extent do left-wing ideologies foster tolerance in the New Federal States? Do subjective economic wants account for contemporary ethnocentrism in post-unification Germany? Additional attention should be paid to the 'postmaterialists', whose aspirations may include a priority on the establishment of a 'multicultural society'. Some empirical results suggest the importance of vague anxieties and social pessimism for differing strength of ethnocentric attitudes.

Introduction

For more than a thousand years political affairs were closely connected with Christian ideology and organization. According to **Durkheim** (1960), 'God' with somewhat changing traits has served as society hypostasized. A religious importance of such kind may also be attached to the integrating concept of a Nation or 'Volk' (people), but there is no essential sociological difference assumed between an assembly of Christians celebrating biblical events or Jews remembering their Exodus from Egypt and a reunion of citizens commemorating a cherished goodness in their national past (**Durkheim** 1960). In spite of all 'secularisation', there seems to be a lasting need of a positive ideological 'intégrisme' (cf. amongst others **Martin** 1978) combined with some kind of 'transcendences' in the differentiated sense of **Luckmann** (1995).

Social relationships are to a large extent constituent for our perception or even construction of reality (**Berger** and **Luckmann** 1974). Many Christians, for instance, imagine or conceive the existence of a God, who is really communicating with men and the existence of a positive community in parish or church. Joining in such a concordant community and attaching respective meanings to the ceremonies in church already exalts beyond the ordinary life. The real event of a somewhat transpersonal communication in practiced church seems to prove to a certain extent that there is true meaning in Christian belief and fellowship. Hence, experiences of solitude, interindividual alienation, hostility and meaninglessness may be expected to be less constituent for the 'Weltanschauung' of Christians in communities than for unchurched people who have not established a functional equivalent. Some kind of 'fait social' or 'Society' in the almost sacral sense of **Durkheim** (1960) is proven (cf. also **Firsching** 1995). Communal religious practices evolving around more or less portentous 'transcendences' (**Luckmann** 1995) are suitable for achieving an in-group identification, a positive social identity and an individual self-conception.

A sociological conceptualization of religion, social integration and supplementing world-views related to economy or moral principles is further exemplified by the following quotation: 'Man's characteristic privilege is that the bond he accepts is not physical but moral; that is, social. ... the source of the crisis is an abrupt growth of power and wealth. Then,

truly as the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to which needs were regulated can no longer remain the same. ... The scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised. ... Since the relations between various parts of society are necessarily modified, the ideas expressing these relations must change. ... Wealth, on the other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into believing that we depend on ourselves only. Reducing the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests the possibility of unlimited success against them ... Not without reason, therefore, have so many religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value of poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching self-restraint. ... From top to bottom of the ladder, greed is aroused without knowing where to find ultimate foothold. ... A thirst arises for novelties, unfamiliar pleasures, nameless sensations, all of which lose their savor once known. Henceforth one has no strength to endure the least reverse.' (*Durkheim* 1951: 252 - 256)

Nevertheless, a combination and maximizing of various subjective, personal demands in the sense of '*Wertesynthese*' (synthesis of values; cf. *Gille* 1994) may of course endorse many positive ideals. One of the challenging ideals could be a positively integrated, multicultural society, where social security, tolerance, hospitality and the protection of various human rights are guaranteed, while the costs ought to be candidly covered by transfers from security spending, higher taxes for the upper milieus or some other 'skilled' politics.

Ethnocentrism: An intergroup differentiation shaping identification

The basic importance of Christian ideology has been clearly shown by European and American history. Accordingly, it has also been demonstrated, if not to say even overrated, by important sociologists as *Durkheim* (1951), *Weber* (1993) and *Tönnies* (1979; cf. also *Greeley* 1995a). As already introduced above, there are some momentous worldviews which are not explicitly attached to a formal church. Union movement, Marxist parties and National Socialism are important examples for organizations proclaiming worldviews which are in some respects similar to traditional religions. An extreme, but very simple example is shown by the quotation of *Adolf Hitler* in *Glock* and *Stark* (1966: XV): 'I believe that I am acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator: by defending myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord.'

In a 'post-modern' period of assumed individualization non-material or material preferences could be dissociated from larger obvious ideologies, but to a certain extent socializing may not succeed without a larger communal reinforcement. In general, we have still to consider individual traits and social group-attachments as constituents of personal identity - and moreover, we have to muse on the intergroup dimension as a medium of externally rooted 'identification'. A basic understanding of social reality is often established by differentiating between an in-group and various out-groups (cf. *Tajfel* 1982; *Wasmer* et al.

1996). A simple interpretation of the social identity theory of *Tajfel* and others could be attached to a nation, a special people (unser Volk) or a church which would be contrasted to various out-groups. The social identity theory proposes that social categorization is employed by individuals not only to systematize and make sense of a complex outer world but also to make sense of oneself. Accordingly, self-concepts are built on both personal identities, who we believe to be as embodied individuals and on an assumed social identity, the groups with which we align or disconnect ourselves. Group (non-) allegiances assist in defining, to ourselves and to others, who we are in terms of our social connections. There are some similarities between the concept of in-group in the sense of social identity theory and the concept of (religious) community proposed by *Durkheim*, but the latter is more often used with positive connotations as 'society' is assumed to be basically sound (cf. the concept of 'anomie' introduced below).

The most extensive in-group of Germany is originally constituted by the German nationality of the parents or at least one of the parents (*ius sanguinis*), not by the place of birth as in some other countries. Note, that present out-groups do not necessarily have to be foreigners and that many people who today are testified Germans have formerly immigrated into the German area. Social problems as rising costs for social services may be attributed to some criticized parts inside the nation (e.g. Germans who shun legal work) or to out-grouped ethnics and migrants, as it is still done today. More or less negatively privileged groups whose members often have a German citizenship could be Jews, Roma, Sinti, 'aus-siedler'¹ or members of certain religious sects and political groups. The definition of an in-group may not be considered as a vague expression of pride and self-esteem, but also as a means of restriction intended to cope with *moral or economic problems*. A very important example with religious, ethnic and economical connotations is the historical role of Jews, who were held responsible for numerous social and even physical problems.

Today, statements about foreigners are increasingly connected with economic assertions about asylum, social welfare, unemployment, national labor market competition, globalization and criminal violence (*Velling* 1994; *Mochmann* and *Oedegaard* 1995; *Albrecht* 1997; *Heitmeyer* 1997).² Diverse impressions about immigrants may be improved or even deteriorated by direct contact. With some groups among the foreigners such contacts can be easier established than with others (e.g. contacts at work cannot be made with ethnics that have yet not entered the labor force), but media reports and political declarations could

1 'Aussiedler' are ethnic Germans being descendants of German farmers and craftspeople who had moved to Eastern Europe in former centuries and came back to Germany after the Second World War.

2 In May 1998 14% of respondents (Politbarometer) named foreigners and asylum as one of the two most important political topics in Germany. The immigration issue has moved into second place, surpassed only by the topic of unemployment (85% of respondents thus designate unemployment as such an especially important issue; Politbarometer 05/98).

counteract personal positive experiences with guest workers, foreign students and other agreeable 'auslander'. It may be brought to notice again that in recent years the nationalities and the motives of immigrants have significantly changed; accordingly the former designation of 'guest workers' (Gastarbeiter) has become more and more untoward for immigrants in general (**Velling** 1994; **Rudolph** 1996; **Blank** and **Schwarzer** 1994; **Blank** and **Wasmer** 1996).

Labor market competition and special identification with an ethnic majority group are probably connected. Therefore, negative economic assessments shall be analysed as subjective background for *competition-based ethnocentrism* (cf. **McCutcheon** 1998). According to these competition-based theories the highest levels of hostility are supposed to occur among majority group-members in the lower strata of social inequality. Following **Kornhauser** (1959) and **McCutcheon** (1998), *mass society-based theories of ethnocentrism* could yield alternative explanations for deviating results. In a low-tension mass society membership in smaller communal groups can protect individuals from taking over extreme ideologies. This may be particularly true, if these communities are characterized by tolerant norms of social conduct. In such liberal or compassionate communities we could assume a positive effect of group-integration, with slight reference to Christian tenets or humanist ethics. On the other hand, many communal groups may foster a more restrictive and less tolerant conception of various outsiders (cf. the discussion of social identity theory above and the idea of 'Gemeinschaft' as used by **Tönnies**).

Some survey items about the acceptance of foreigners in Germany

Originally, the term 'guest worker' was used to refer to foreign laborers who had since 1955 been recruited from certain countries in Southern Europe and North Africa (cf. **Thränhardt** 1988; **Velling** 1994; **Kühnel** and **Terwey** 1994). For some time, guest workers almost determined the public image of 'foreigners' in West Germany. In contrast to smaller numbers of other immigrants from the Northwest or Central Europe they were often perceived as apparently foreign, and they made up the vast majority of all immigrants till the mid 80s.

The guest workers of the 60s and early 70s were practically invited to immigrate, because there was a shortage of labor supply. They had politically unlimited admission to enter the German labor force and hence the guest workers were having an extremely high employment rate. Later, images about 'foreigners' in Germany were modified due to new subgroups of migrants. Many of the recent foreign migrants are not 'invited guests' who assist in overcoming a shortage of labor supply, but they are unemployed and somehow unwanted refugees dependent on social welfare assistance. The migrants from Eastern Europe as well as the asylum seekers from Asia and Africa are primarily to be mentioned in this

respect. Even though views about 'guest workers' from the time of recruitment after 1955 remained important factors in featuring the public opinion about immigrants, these new streams of immigration nurtured new identifications for out-groups from abroad. Moreover, the immigrants in the early 90s contrast with previous ones by their higher heterogeneity (*Velling* 1994). East Germans and 'aussiedler', East European labor migrants, asylum seekers and civil war refugees from various places compete with the major former migrant groups. The new quality of immigrants from far abroad also influences their position in the present labor market which is not in a very favorable condition anyway. Whereas according to *ius sanguinis* 'aussiedler' as ethnic Germans have not been subject to any legal labor market restrictions at all, other migrant groups have been confronted with severe obstacles to find a job.

There is a list of so-called 'guest worker'-items in ALLBUS. These questions are among those ALLBUS-items which have been used for research most frequently (e.g. *Krauth* and *Porst* 1984; *Gehring* and *Böltken* 1985; *Blank* and *Schwarzer* 1994; *Blank* and *Wasmer* 1996; *Kühnel* and *Terwey* 1990, 1994; *Terwey* 1989). In the following analyses, primarily four of these guest worker items are used as indicators of ethnocentrism (cf. ZA and ZUMA 1996, 1997):

- (1) Guest workers (after 1994 Split 2: foreigners living in Germany) should adapt their life style a little better to that of Germans (ADAPTATION)
- (2) Guest workers (after 1994 Split 2: foreigners living in Germany) should be sent back home when there is a shortage of jobs in Germany. (REMIGRATION)
- (3) Guest workers (after 1994 Split 2: foreigners living in Germany) should be forbidden to participate in any political activities. (NO POLITICS)
- (4) Guest workers (after 1994 Split 2: foreigners living in Germany) should choose their marriage partners among their countrymen. (ENDOGAMY)³

Answers were classified on a seven-point scale: 1. Don't agree at all...7. Agree completely. Moreover, there are four other items dealing with different types of personal contacts with guest workers or foreigners living in Germany. These contact items will later be used in analysis.

3 (1) Gastarbeiter (ab 1994 Split 2: die in Deutschland lebenden Ausländer) sollten ihren Lebensstil ein bißchen besser an den der Deutschen anpassen.
 (2) Wenn Arbeitsplätze knapp werden, sollte man die Gastarbeiter (ab 1994 Split 2: die in Deutschland lebenden Ausländer) wieder in ihre Heimat zurückschicken.
 (3) Man sollte Gastarbeitern (ab 1994 Split 2: den in Deutschland lebenden Ausländern) jede politische Betätigung in Deutschland untersagen.
 (4) Gastarbeiter (ab 1994 Split 2: Die in Deutschland lebenden Ausländer) sollten sich ihre Ehepartner unter ihren eigenen Landsleuten auswählen. (cf. ZA and ZUMA 1997)

Growing ethnocentrism in West Germany?

Many political discussions and media-reports have pointed out a growing salience of the immigration issues and a restrengthening of ethnocentrism in present Germany. In the aftermath of economic recession, globalization, worldwide migration and abdication of the socialist regime, several ethnic and even religious conflicts may possibly become more portentous. Muslims appear to be important candidates for out-groupings in a world viewed as sliding into a 'clash of civilizations', where religious and ethnic differences do visibly coincide. In spite of all, a lot of German media coverage, declarations by church officials and many political statements are still aimed at promoting further integration.


The increasing share of foreign residents in Germany since the 'economic miracle' (*Wirtschaftswunder*) in the 60s has to be recognized as an important demographic change (cf. **Rudolph** 1996; **Fassmann** and **Münz** 1996), which has influenced certain areas more than others. Some selected data from the Federal Bureau of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt 1997) may illustrate this:

- In West Germany the proportion of foreigners has risen considerably from 1.2% in 1961 to 10.2% in 1995 (1989: 7.7%)
- In post-socialist East Germany the shares of foreigners remained at notably lower levels of 1.2% in 1989 and about 1.7% in 1995
- In urban areas, the proportion of foreigners is much higher (e.g., Frankfurt (1994): 29.2%, Mannheim 21.1%, Cologne: 19.4%, Hamburg: 15.4%, Berlin: 12.6%)
- All in all, compared to other West European countries Germany has an especially high percentage of foreign residents (about 40% of all foreigners in 10 West European countries live in Germany followed by France with about 21%; **Fassmann** and **Münz** 1996: 39). This high share of foreign residents may be in part attributed to legal obstacles of civil integration (*ius sanguinis*).

According to the Statistisches Bundesamt (1997: 40) most foreigners came to the former Bundesrepublik (BRD) in search of employment. This seemed to be appropriate in a prospering post-war economy. In the 'Wirtschaftswunder' some connections between the ethnic, nationalist or religious out-groupings and economic issues seemed to lose priority. The guest workers were often considered to do hard jobs thought to be undesirable for Germans.

As far as our four items for ethnocentrism are concerned, the relationships between the four series remain similar since 1980 (cf. Chart 1). All four indicators show decreases of ethnocentric statements in West Germany until 1994. Considering media coverage and political discussions on that topic, this result seems somewhat surprising. A probably dwindling proportion of the German population may have caused a strong impression of xenophobia by dramatic articulations of hostility (cf. **Leenen** 1995).

CHART 1: Support for ADAPTATION, REMIGRATION, NO POLITICS, and ENDOGAMY with regard to foreigners or guest workers



However, from 1994 till 1996 the ethnocentric intolerance amongst ALLBUS respondents becomes more frequent again.⁴ The 'softer' the indicator, the more it seems to yield a rising tendency of criticism towards immigrants:


- ENDOGAMY has been supported the least and thus stands for a fairly strict kind of exclusion. The rise from 1994 to 1996 is only two percentage points (18% vs. 20%).
- Since 1984 the demand for REMIGRATION in case of scarce jobs with regard to frequency follows right after endogamy in second place (1994: 22%, 1996: 25%).
- Prohibiting political activities of foreigners has been supported with similar frequencies till 1990. After that NO POLITICS seems to take a slightly different trend than ENDOGAMY and REMIGRATION. More demand for control of political activities may have been caused by some striking actions of small radical groups in Germany (1994: 32%, 1996: 36%).
- Most frequent, however, is the demand for ADAPTATION of life-style as can be seen from Chart 1. The recent increase from 49% to 59% in this somehow soft indicator of ethnocentrism is particularly obvious, but wishing such adaptation may also express some kind of readiness to integrate foreigners under certain conditions.

⁴ A slightly increasing intolerance of foreigners can also be seen in a time series of another German survey, the 'Politbarometer' (ZA-Nr. 2391).

A basic comparison of ethnocentrism in East and West Germany

Compared to the Old Federal States, Eastern Germany shows at least a similar increase in ethnocentrism from 1994 to 1996.⁵ However, the overall level of ethnocentric inclinations is even higher in East Germany though fewer foreigners do really dwell there (cf. Chart 2). Ethnocentrism does not necessarily have to correlate with the number of foreigners living in a country. A small out-group which is viewed as unwelcome, or even a reference group that is hardly present at all, can attract a lot of aversion or serve as an aim for negativity caused by social problems in a transforming society. Particularly, the demand for remigration, when the labor market is tight, has increased strongly from 30% to 41% in the New Federal States. We may presume that in an economic situation often perceived as falling below a proper standard the criticism of outlandish minorities is an outlet of negative feelings. This finding may be seen as some kind of support for competition-based theories of ethnocentrism (cf. additional results in: *McCutcheon* 1998). But on the other hand, a constructive ideology providing positive values for integration in the sense of *Durkheim* may also be lacking. We shall see later that in ALLBUS 1996 some direct evaluations of individual deprivation do not perform as well in detailed analyses of ethnocentrism as it could have been expected ex ante.


CHART 2: Support of ADAPTATION, REMIGRATION, NO POLITICS, and ENDOGAMY with regard to foreigners in Germany



West and East German Respondents (5 - 7 in a 7-point-scale (ALLBUS 1994, 1996))

5 For 1994 only the survey split that used the wording 'foreigners' has been included in the East-West comparison shown in Chart 2.

CHART 3: Ethnocentrism (ETHNOCENT) in Germany since 1980
(average PCA-Scores for ADAPTATION, REMIGRATION,
NO POLITICS, ENDOGAMY combined)



Notwithstanding some singularities of meaning and measurement, all four indicators can be reduced into *one single principal component* or factor by exploratory analysis. This is a pretty stable result for each year of measurement (cf. also a comparison of confirmatory factor analysis and latent class analysis in: *Kühnel* and *Terwey* 1990). The average scores of a principal component analysis (PCA) across all ALLBUS-data available are shown in Chart 3. Again, the resulting latent variable discloses an increasing acceptance of foreigners up to 1994 and a decline after that. However, the average in 1996 indicates still less ethnocentrism than in 1980, when our measurements were started.

After introducing our basic indicators of ethnocentrism and the latent common component extracted to reduce some of the complexities, we shall proceed with a brief outline of structural differentiations which we expect to be related with ethnocentrism.

Secularization, social disintegration and enlightenment: The case of Germany

Youth in search of positive and negative self-identification is often in the vanguard of social change. Younger people lean towards convictions which they regard as progressive. Since the late 60s, especially the better educated parts of the younger generation have stressed human rights and a continuing enlightenment which ought to free us more and more from uncomprehended traditional forces, which have been considered to be repressive.

Today, traditional churches in Germany are still confronted with a severe loss of members. This withdrawal from traditional organizations proclaiming a Christian worldview is especially significant among young and better-educated people. A lowering percentage of church members in the general population may be seen as an important indicator of a trend towards increasing secularization in Western Europe. The question is open, whether secularized Europeans replace Christian attitudes by morals which are even closer attached to those human rights protecting outsider minorities or ethnic groups.

Christian adherence was frequently correlated with the acceptance of traditional values in society (*Durkheim* 1951; *Inglehart* 1998; *Pappi* and *Terwey* 1982). Yet today, churches seem to display a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards the acceptance of liberal human rights. First, there is a large part of conservative church members, who may be more alienated towards immigrants than the more secularized parts of the population. They could even claim some of the ethnocentric parts in the Old Testament as a foundation. Secondly, some Christian representatives play an important role in the public declaring their care for disadvantaged 'neighbors' in this world (cf. the concept of a tolerant community introduced above). The latter position may presently be seen as more corresponding to the commandments of Jesus Christ and his apostles than crusading attitudes and parts of the Old Testament. At first sight, the prevalent general teaching of church in Germany has changed from more rigid and intimidating aspects towards expressions of hope and charity (*Ebertz* 1993; *Greeley* 1995; *Terwey* 1993). Such differing attitudes within churches may be correlating with simple demographic disparities. Actually, the older Christians are often expected to be more conservative and ethnically oriented than the younger ones, and we formulate an expectation for members in the bigger German churches (Volkskirchen): *Controlling for age, Christians organized in the predominant churches should be more tolerant of ethnic minorities than non-Christians.*⁶

Anyway, another determinant of ethnic tolerance has to be considered in this context. The effects of secularization as decreasing influence of mainstream-churches would be leading to less liberal ethnic orientations, if they are not counteracted by the main-force of enlightenment, i.e. rational *education*. If maximizing of subjective demands is based on sound material security, it may be expected to have a special stronghold among people with higher credentials and in the superior white collar milieu, which is on average materially rather secure and well-equipped (*Pappi* and *Terwey* 1982). Educational attainment or certified *human capital* is somehow a meritocratic backbone in the white-collar hierarchy and

6 A striking feature is the extraordinarily high degree of unchurched people in Eastern Germany. This result is unparalleled in many other ex-socialist countries for which we have survey data (cf. *Greeley* 1995; *Terwey* 1998). If our optimistic expectations about reduced ethnocentrism amongst church members are appropriate, the radical secularisation in the former GDR could explain much about the important role that ethnocentrism plays in the New Federal States.

for various reasons also in the milieu of self-employed (cf. **Terwey** 1987). There is an important interplay of social class and education in several respects, which is expected to go beyond the sphere of obvious pecuniary inequality. On the other hand, formal education conveys also individual culture, erudition or '*Bildung*' in the sense of German 'Neuhumanismus' and rational *enlightenment*. Both components of education may result in rationalistic substitutes for traditional Christian persuasions (cf. **Meulemann** 1985, 1996). Modern education is overtly not turning people to some kind of heathenish transcendentalism and the component of Christian teaching in school is apparently not dominant. We can clearly begin to see the need for a multivariate model as a check for some crossing effects: *People with higher education prove true to the ethics of liberal enlightenment and shun ethnocentric prejudice.*

Table 1 provides us with introductory information about relations between church attachment and ethnocentrism while controlling for some relevant socio-demographic differences. An initial impression of aggregate differences between *East and West Germany* has already been given by Chart 2 and 3, but now we can also see how much individual data variation is explainable at the individual level. The multiple classification analysis (MCA) shows a moderate bivariate effect of $\eta^2=.11$ which is slightly reduced by the control of other variables also listed in Table 1 ($\beta=.09$). On average the New Federal States deviate .22 or .18 respectively from the Grand Mean (.00) towards higher ethnocentrism.⁷

Corresponding to our expectations, we recognise that *age of the respondents* ($\eta^2=.36$, $\beta=.28$) is in fact a very important correlate of differential ethnocentrism. Older people are considerably more reluctant about foreigners in Germany. Our assumptions are also definitely confirmed as far as the role of higher *education* is concerned. The impact of education ($\eta^2=.41$, $\beta=.24$) is similarly strong as the estimated age-effect. Besides, people living in places of larger *community size* (i.e. administrative community size) tend to be moderately less ethnocentric ($\eta^2=.16$, $\beta=.09$).

Differential objective welfare position is indicated by *social milieus* in Table 1 which can be constituted by direct or indirect relation to the occupational system (cf. **Geiger** 1967; **Terwey** 1987; 1990).⁸ Expectations are confirmed that people in the rather secure and materially well provided milieu of the upper white collars are much less ethnocentric than the farmers and the lower blue collars. A rather high bivariate effect of $\eta^2=.29$ is substantially reduced by the statistical controls ($\beta=.12$) as levels of education and community size are

7 A gender variable is omitted in Table 1. There is no relevant gender difference as far as this kind of ethnocentrism is concerned.

8 Incomes of the respondents and of their households were also tested as measurements of material welfare. Both types of income showed significant bivariate effects. However, the multivariate impacts proved to be comparatively small.

Table 1: Multiple Classification Analysis for demographic predictors of ethnocentrism factor (ALLBUS 1996, results weighted to adjust the Eastern oversample; positive signs mean higher ethnocentrism)

	n	Unadjusted deviation	eta	Adjusted for independents deviation	beta
Part of Germany					
1 Old Federal States	2454	-,06		-,05	
2 New Federal States	640	,22		,18	
			,11		,09
Age					
1 18-29 years of age	548	-,44		-,35	
2 30-44 years	949	-,27		-,20	
3 45-59 years	845	,12		,10	
4 60 years or more	751	,53		,39	
			,36		,28
Education					
1 Primary education	287	,72		,43	
2 Primary & vocational	1203	,28		,14	
3 Medium Education	901	-,13		-,05	
4 Higher Education	339	-,53		-,26	
5 University, college	364	-,66		-,44	
			,41		,24
Community Size					
1 Less 2000 inhabitants	239	,32		,19	
2 2000-4999	325	,18		,05	
3 5000-19999	739	,10		,07	
4 20000-49999	525	-,02		-,02	
5 50000-99999	256	-,05		-,08	
6 100000-499999	618	-,12		-,04	
7 Over 499999	392	-,28		-,14	
			,16		,09
Social Milieu					
1 Farmers	62	,58		,14	
2 Small self-employed	115	-,28		-,12	
3 Employers	140	-,19		-,06	
4 Upper white collar	672	-,42		-,19	
5 Lower white collar	1014	-,01		,01	
6 Upper blue collar	155	,12		-,02	
7 Lower blue collar	937	,33		,14	
			,29		,12
Denomination					
1 Protestants, EKD	1216	,02		-,01	
2 Other Protestants	36	,37		,03	
3 Catholics	1016	,02		,04	
4 Other religions	45	-,23		-,08	
5 No church at all	781	-,07		-,03	
			,06		,03
Church Attendance					
1 Several times a month	496	,13		-,02	
2 Several times a year	583	,00		-,01	
3 Less often	1039	-,02		,01	
4 Never	975	-,04		,00	
			,06		,01

Multiple R = ,505

to a certain degree accentuated in these milieus. Nevertheless, the impacts of more or less well provided milieus support competition-based explanations of ethnocentrism.

Subsequently, it can be realized from Table 1 that the *denominational groups* inside of Christian churches are a little more ethnocentric than the formally unchurched people. Less tolerance is at first sight especially shown by members of 'evangelische Freikirchen' ('Other Protestants') outside of the Lutheran mainstream (Evangelische Kirche Deutsch-

lands (EKD)). This group of conservative 'Freikirchen' is, however, only pretty small. At least the bivariate description of *church attendance* in unified Germany seems to reveal a systematic pattern, but this globally observed pattern is in contrast to the expectations of enhanced tolerance in the active church-communities. Moreover, the effects of Christian denomination and church attendance tend to vanish in the multivariate part of the analysis in Table 1. These findings will be tested again by several multiple regression in order to see whether the minor effects now shown may disappear completely or may become stronger again. First, we shall turn to another introductory overview of secular and political assessments.

Perceptions of economic situations, anomia and diffuse political support

The subjective evaluation of economic conditions is expected to be one of the most important reasons behind many other conceptions, attitudes and preferences. Note, that according to the rather conservative view of *Durkheim* (1951) economic dissatisfaction or greed may result in an anomic worldview, which is partly not rooted in material poverty, but in the stimulation of wishes that can never be completely satisfied (cf. the quotation at the beginning of our text). The aspirations in economically caused anomia exceed legitimate boundaries and impede the livability of individuals or human society.

It has already been indicated that economic dissatisfaction, envies and fears are spreading again in unified Germany up to 1996. In particular, the evaluation of Germany's overall economic situation deteriorated dramatically after a very positive state around 1990. At first sight, Eastern and Western Germany are even very similar in this respect – a phenomenon that would deserve more attention in future analysis. A first step in this direction is a comparison between the assessments of the German economy and of the respondents' own economic situation. These do frequently diverge.

- (a) The evaluation of the general situation is a rather volatile opinion on social policy in general. It expresses diffuse political unease, which must not correspond to a real economic scarcity.
- (b) The evaluation of the respondent's own economical situation is generally more stable and frequently connected to the objectively measurable welfare of the respondents (cf. *Terwey* 1990, 1997).

Either because of diffuse economical fears or because of subjective material deprivation the acceptance of ethnic strangers may be low. The most important example in German history may be found in the period of the worldwide economic crisis at the end of the 20s, which facilitated the expansion of National Socialist ideology and an anti-Semitic conspiracy theory (cf. *Popper* 1974: 123). All in all, our expectations are: *Negative assessments of the general economic situation in Germany are positively related with ethnocentrism. For different reasons, similar expectation may also be appropriate for the effects of the assessments of personal economic situations.*

It has already been shown by empirical analyses that several attitudinal trends in Germany have changed since 1990 (e.g. *Terwey* 1995, 1996, 1997). In the course of far reaching societal transformations, previously valid social ideals and habits (*nomos*) loose influence on the individuals (*Durkheim* 1951, 1960), and a state occurs which lacks effective and positively accepted rules for living. Primarily with regard to society, these insecurities about social norms have been referred to as '*anomie*'. This concept is used with a conservative meaning. Usually, a positive preeminence of social tradition and integration is assumed, which is often beyond the scope of individual intellects and wants. Those individuals who positively accept their given society tend towards '*eunomia*' (*Srole* 1956). It may be easily understood that a fundamental characteristic of such eunomia is a general social optimism and social attachment. Other individuals who feel that important cultural goals are devalued in society or that there are no more legal means to reach these goals probably come to a pessimistic interpretation of their contemporary society. These people tend towards individual '*anomia*' (*Srole* 1956; *Merton* 1970; *Friedrichs* 1997).

If there is some kind of lasting dissatisfaction about society which cannot be traced to easy causes and the solution of the problems appears to be difficult, we all may tend to look for some scapegoat to put the blame on. Racist organizations could provide people in loss of appropriate community with a pseudo-communal surrogate. Therefore, we may expect a positive link between anomia and opposition against some social minorities (cf. *Srole* 1956; *Heitmeyer* 1997).

We examine anomia as some kind of social pessimism about future and interpersonal commitment using four items from ALLBUS (ZA and ZUMA 1997):

1. No matter what some people say, the situation of common people is not getting better, but worse (WORSE SITUATION).
2. It is hardly fair to bring children into the world with way things look for the future (NO CHILDREN).
3. Most politicians are not at all interested in the problems of common people (CARELESS POLITICIANS)
4. Most people do not really care, what happens to their fellow men (CARELESS MAJORITY).⁹

9 (1) Egal, was manche Leute sagen: Die Situation der einfachen Leute wird nicht besser, sondern schlechter.
 (2) So wie die Zukunft aussieht, kann man es kaum noch verantworten, Kinder auf die Welt zu bringen.
 (3) Die meisten Politiker interessieren sich in Wirklichkeit gar nicht für die Probleme der einfachen Leute.
 (4) Die meisten Leute kümmern sich in Wirklichkeit gar nicht darum, was mit ihren Mitmenschen geschieht.

CHART 4: 'Birth of children is hardly fair with this future' and negative assessments of the German economy in general




Chart 4 shows recently growing percentages of people who agree with the indicator NO CHILDREN as an example of recent changes in anomia. We may add that NO CHILDREN is the statement which attracts least consent among the four ALLBUS-indicators and reveals, hence, a deeper kind of discouragement. Comparing different years in Chart 4, this profound pessimism seems to be a little bit less frequent in 1991, but spreads afterwards especially in East Germany. On the other hand, the percentages of persons who describe the general economic situation in Germany as bad have grown even more since 1991. Both outlooks seem to covariate only moderately with each other, as far as it can be derived from the aggregated percentages in Chart 4. The other three indicators of anomia, not included in Chart 4, show steeper rising tendencies during the 90s after a slight betterment had eventuated before in Western Germany (cf. *Terwey* 1997). In general, anomia and intolerance or out-grouping may be expected to correlate. Our expectation reformulated is: *Anomia is positively correlated with ethnocentrism.*

Table 2: Multiple Classification Analysis for economy assessment, anomia and diffuse political support as predictors of ethnocentrism factor (ALLBUS 1996, results weighted to adjust the Eastern oversample)

	n	Unadjusted deviation	eta	Adjusted for independents deviation	beta
Part of Germany					
1 Old Federal States	1984	-,06		-,04	
2 New Federal States	512	,25		,14	
			,13		,07
WORSE SITUATION					
0 Have other opinion	362	-,15		,05	
1 Have same opinion	2134	,03		-,01	
			,06		,02
NO CHILDREN					
0 Have other opinion	1423	-,21		-,15	
1 Have same opinion	1073	,28		,19	
			,24		,17
CARELESS POLITICIANS					
0 Have other opinion	428	-,38		-,23	
1 Have same opinion	2068	,08		,05	
			,18		,11
CARELESS MAJORITY					
0 Have other opinion	536	-,14		,01	
1 Have same opinion	1960	,04		,00	
			,07		,01
Satisfaction with German democracy					
1 It functions well	236	-,10		,04	
2 Only little change	1660	-,09		-,05	
3 Don't know	77	,44		,32	
4 Much to change	463	,24		,08	
5 Completely to change	61	,50		,13	
			,17		,08
German economic situation					
1 Very good	23	-,39		-,20	
2 Good	305	-,14		-,03	
3 So-so	1158	-,09		-,05	
4 Bad	833	,10		,04	
5 Very bad	177	,41		,21	
			,15		,07
Personal economic situation					
1 Very good	56	-,62		-,44	
2 Good	1221	-,10		-,03	
3 So-so	965	,09		,02	
4 Bad	190	,24		,10	
5 Very bad	64	,49		,24	
			,17		,08

Multiple R = ,322

The MCA-model in Table 2 shows the bivariate correlations and multivariate adjusted effects while the basic East-West-split is included again. Each of the four anomia items discloses higher average ethnocentrism in the group of assenters. A systematic difference is especially found for political alienated ones (CARELESS POLITICIANS; $\eta^2=.18$, $\beta^2=.11$) and existential pessimists (NO CHILDREN; $\eta^2=.24$, $\beta^2=.17$). The notions of a CARELESS MAJORITY and of a WORSE SITUATION for common people appear to be more unsystematic in this respect. However, our expectations about anomia as a background for ethnocentric out-grouping receive some support.

Satisfaction with the democratic system is also closely related to the expansion of anomia. If we do a factor analysis with the four anomia items in ALLBUS, one single common factor results and the indicator CARELESS POLITICIANS turns out with the strongest loading. Still we should introduce another indicator which has less specific connotations about an assumed misconduct of politicians. Judging the overall *performance of a democracy* is often considered to be an expression of deeply rooted, *diffuse political support* (Easton 1979; Terwey 1996). A lack of diffuse political support could also be considered to be a supplemental indicator for social disintegration. In fact, those respondents who ask for a change of our democratic system are rather often more ethnocentric than the positively supporting citizens ($\eta^2=.17$, $\beta^2=.08$).

Following *Durkheim* (1951), subjective economic dissatisfaction and greed are basically linked with social anomie or subjective anomia and it has been pointed out that ethnocentrism and racism have some kind of individual economic background (cf. amongst others *Krauth* and *Porst* 1984; *Küchler* 1994; *Steußloff* 1997). To some surprise, results in Table 2 show that subjective assessments of economy have noticeable, but not very strong impacts. Positive perceptions of the general and personal situation are both at least moderately associated with more tolerance ($\eta^2=.15$ or $.17$). In our first MCA, the measurement of social inequality by structural milieus was closer related to the varying acceptance of foreigners (cf. $\eta^2=.29$ in Table 1).

'Postmaterialism': Shifting political preferences

The work of diverse authors on the shift from 'materialist' to 'postmaterialist' preferences has attracted a worldwide attention. A common context of anomia and such value change was proposed by *Friedrichs* (1997). Postmaterialist aspirations, which seemed to be safe and sound, but presently fail to meet reality, may be one of the causes for dwindling self-security and growing anomia.

Even though the thesis of flourishing postmaterialism has stimulated the analysis of contemporary societies, it has often been criticized. The author of this article claims almost no

personal interest in the battered issue whether the measurements of postmaterialism are restricted to mere attitudes or reach deeper to the 'real personal values'. The simple index introduced by **Inglehart** (1971) can provide – at the very least – an interesting onset for describing political priorities which are in a broader sense to be understood as strains between 'postmodern' worldviews, even though many of **Maslow's** ideas remain distant to much of the research since **Inglehart** (1971).¹⁰

In the simple index of **Inglehart**, postmaterialists are those for whom 'influence on governmental decisions' and 'free expression of opinions' have priority over 'law and order' and 'fighting rising prices'. ALLBUS-data confirm assumptions that West German postmaterialism still increased after a striking period of prosperity (Wirtschaftswunder). The economic recessions which occurred at the end of the sixties and the mid-seventies were quickly overcome to a large extent. Even the pessimistic expectations of many people at the beginning of the eighties were reduced after the new coalition of CDU/CSU and F.D.P. took charge of politics in the economic sphere. However, the social expansion of postmaterialism did stop after the end of the 80s. As the economic burdens increased after German unification, a noticeable re-decline was observed (**Terwey** 1995). Besides, the New Federal States, which are still in a relatively disadvantageous economic situation, have shown considerably lower levels of postmaterialism than the West.

As postmaterialists according to the simple Inglehart-Index have a strong interest in democratic participation, humanitarian considerations and personal freedom, they may also be supposed to have a positive interest in an universal application of human rights. Therefore, we expect: *People who are described as postmaterialists have less tendency toward ethnic segregation.* Table 3 investigates the relation between ethnocentrism and postmaterialism while some other political attitudes are additionally controlled.

10 According to **Inglehart's** interpretation of **Maslow** (1954) about a hierarchy of human goals, cohorts who had experienced wars and economic scarcities in the phases preceding the 'economic miracles' (Wirtschaftswunder) would ceteris paribus put relatively high priority on economic security and safety needs. Postmaterialism – flourishing in cohorts who experienced high material affluence – aims at intellectual needs, aesthetic pursuits, humanitarian considerations, and good opportunities for personal self-expression. Amongst others, it is expected to replace most traditional religious orientations in a modern affluent society. Only a part of these assumptions have been examined by empirical analyses.

Table 3: Multiple Classification Analysis: Political preferences predicting ethnocentrism factor (ALLBUS 1996, results weighted to adjust the Eastern oversample)

	n	Unadjusted deviation	eta	Adjusted for independents deviation	beta
Part of Germany					
1 Old Federal States	2213	-,06		-,05	
2 New Federal States	591	,22		,18	
			,11		,09
Inglehart-Index					
1 Postmaterialists	648	-,61		-,36	
2 PM-Mixed Type	815	-,07		-,06	
3 Material.-Mixed Type	954	,27		,17	
4 Materialists	387	,50		,32	
			,38		,23
Left-right-selfplacement					
1 Left	57	-,32		-,21	
2	114	-,47		-,23	
3	316	-,41		-,23	
4	351	-,31		-,18	
5	774	-,03		-,05	
6	609	,22		,13	
7	303	,17		,08	
8	171	,47		,37	
9	50	,53		,41	
10 Right	59	,78		,44	
			,30		,18
Government spending for defense					
1 Spend much more	44	1,01		,60	
2 Spend a little more	142	,53		,27	
3 Keep it as it is	680	,20		,10	
4 Spend less	1072	-,11		-,06	
5 Spend much less	866	-,16		-,07	
			,23		,12
Government spending for police					
1 Spend much more	596	,38		,15	
2 Spend a little more	1110	,05		,02	
3 Keep it as it is	951	-,23		-,09	
4 Spend less	125	-,44		-,19	
5 Spend much less	23	-,65		-,31	
			,25		,10
Government spending for pensions					
1 Spend much more	371	,41		,25	
2 Spend a little more	924	,09		,05	
3 Keep it as it is	1379	-,15		-,09	
4 Spend less	120	-,27		-,17	
5 Spend much less	11	-,09		,09	
			,20		,12
Government spending for environment					
1 Spend much more	603	-,31		-,20	
2 Spend a little more	1005	-,03		,01	
3 Keep it as it is	1030	,12		,06	
4 Spend less	153	,58		,34	
5 Spend much less	13	,59		,10	
			,22		,13

cont'd

Table 3 (*continued*):

	n	Unadjusted deviation eta	Adjusted for independents deviation beta
Government spending for culture and art			
1 Spend much more	79	-,09	-,15
2 Spend a little more	368	-,18	-,14
3 Keep it as it is	1296	-,05	-,03
4 Spend less	787	,06	,05
5 Spend much less	275	,36	,25
		,14	,10

Multiple R = ,521

Indeed, postmaterialism reveals a remarkable effect ($\eta=.38$, $\beta=.23$), which is even comparable to the effects of education and age, the strongest predictors introduced yet (cf. Table 1). Another strong impact is shown for the left-right-scale, which serves as a general medium for the expression of many political issue and conflict positions. Hence, we try to isolate a left-right component which is probably also included in the Inglehart-Index, and look at the multivariate results for both predictors: Ethnocentrism is also strongly related to left-right-placement with $\eta=.30$ and $\beta=.18$. People who perceive themselves as belonging to the political right wing still tend to be more ethnocentric.

Our conclusion is in this respect that a general left self-orientation provides some people with an important belief-system which fosters pro-immigrant sentiments. Additional separate regressions for East and West Germany show that tolerance is significantly influenced by this ideology in both areas.

Nevertheless, differences between postmaterialists and materialists are at least of comparable relevance as left-right-ideology. It has to be admitted, of course, that the analysis of postmaterialism will profit from the inclusion of further qualifying indicators. The Inglehart-Index contrasts two indicators of preference for democratic influence and liberty with one material issue (inflation) and one security issue (law and order). Priorities for ecology or general culture are at least explicitly neglected in the simple Inglehart-Index. Table 3 shows in addition five indicators of further political preferences. People were asked, whether they would like to increase the amounts of money spent by the government for certain areas. These spending options can help to go a little beyond the somewhat incomplete index-measurement of far-reaching ideals presented to us under the headline 'post-materialism'. Security issues are often connected with traditional political orientations which are attributed to 'materialism'. According to some results in Table 3, the safety oriented preferences to spend more money for defense and police are significantly connected with higher ethnocentrism. The same tendency is disclosed for the people asking more money to be spent on old-age pensions. On the other hand, postmaterialist options for more investment in conservation of environment and culture or art are corresponding with higher

acceptance of foreigners. Thus the findings for the simple Inglehart-Index in Table 3 are supported and extended in further details. Ethnic tolerance has some significant correlations with so-called postmaterialistic or non-materialistic priorities.

Reported contacts with foreigners and religious tolerance

Besides the four 'guest worker'-items introduced already for the measurement of ethnocentrism, there are four additional items in ALLBUS about *personal contacts* with foreigners living in Germany (ALLBUS 1994/split 1 and 1996) or up to ALLBUS 1994 with guest workers respectively. These questions deal with four different social spheres: FAMILY, WORKING PLACE, NEIGHBORHOOD and FRIENDS (including acquaintances). We shall now investigate these contacts as potential sources for the acceptance of *auslander*. It is often expected by open-minded scientists and cosmopolitans that the more inter-ethnic contacts are reported, the less out-classing is involved. Mutual knowledge may diminish negative prejudice (*Rippl* 1995), or people who are in favor of foreigners may be readier to acknowledge even transient forms of company as personal contacts. It is to some extent plausible that contacts often foster better understanding and acceptance: Familiarity breeds consent. But putting this assumption to a test would not be as unimportant as it may appear at first sight. Note the assumptions about tolerance increased by everyday contacts could fail in practice. Such a reverse influence of probably involuntary contacts may be found in many social settings.¹¹ A finding that 'familiarity breeds contempt' would indicate some pretty serious problem for future integration of minorities.

Overall, MCA-results in Table 4 show that people who reported personal contacts with foreigners living in Germany tend to be less ethnocentric. Only a smaller part of the respondents in ALLBUS may have drawn ethnocentric conclusions from these social experiences or have remained intolerant. The strongest predictor among the four contact items is the experience amongst personal friends or acquaintances ($\eta^2=.35$, $\beta=.26$). The multivariate effect of the East-West-split almost disappears. East Germans report much less personal communications with foreigners, and a larger part of their relative distance towards *auslander* is statistically correlated with this.

11 " .. experimental studies have .. concluded that only when intergroup contact occurs under highly auspicious circumstances should favorable attitude change be anticipated. ... In nonexperimental context, a major nationwide survey ... found that the racial views of whites whose circle of friends included a black person closely paralleled the views of whites with no black friends ..." (*Sigelman and Welch* 1993: 782).

Table 4: Multiple Classification Analysis for contact items and religious teaching preferences as predictors of ethnocentrism factor (ALLBUS 1996, results weighted to adjust the Eastern oversample)

	n	Unadjusted deviation	eta	Adjusted for independents deviation	beta
Part of Germany					
1 Old Federal States	2507	-,06		,01	
2 New Federal States	654	,21		-,05	
			,11		,02
Contacts with foreigners: Family area					
0 No contacts	2644	,06		,02	
1 Yes, have contacts	517	-,33		-,10	
			,15		,04
Contacts with foreigners: Working area					
0 No contacts	1933	,21		,12	
1 Yes, have contacts	1228	-,33		-,19	
			,26		,15
Contacts with foreigners: Neighborhood					
0 No contacts	2185	,11		,02	
1 Yes, have contacts	976	-,25		-,04	
			,16		,03
Contacts with foreigners: Friendship					
0 No contacts	1791	,31		,23	
1 Yes, have contacts	1370	-,40		-,30	
			,35		,26
Preference for religious teachings					
1 Islam lessons too	1042	-,32		-,24	
2 Only Christian lessons	1015	,37		,29	
3 No religious lessons	1104	-,03		-,04	
			,28		,22
Multiple R = ,447					

It has to be regrettably acknowledged that we could not yet include more indications of substantive religious beliefs or attitudes in our investigation. But ALLBUS 1996 has at least one additional indicator for the personal opinion about *religious pluralism and tolerance*. The respondents were asked whether they wish that Islam should be taught in German schools as an alternative to Christian teachings. Two further options given in this item are: no religious teaching at all or only Christian lessons.¹² Noticeably, this predictor performs rather well (eta=.28, beta=.22). An exclusive preference for Christian teaching is correlated with latent ethnocentrism and thus this conventional option reveals some intol-

12 The demand for a general restriction of religious teaching is not necessarily an indicator for secularism in general – tolerant secularists would neither mind the opportunity of Christian teachings, nor of Muslim teaching in school. One could personally reject theistic belief, but accept the religious ethics as a valuable choice.

erance. Those secularization supporters who want no religious teaching at all deviate only marginally from the Grand Mean towards slightly reduced ethnocentrism.

An expanded explanation of ethnocentrism

We have introduced some basic socio-demographic differentiations, social group affiliations and a sequence of subjective articulations about the state our society is in or should be in. The results from the separate MCA-tables shall now be tested in comprehensive competition by regression analysis. In addition, extensions of this multi-faceted, but global model will be briefly discussed afterwards.

Amongst socio-demographic predictors, *age* ($\beta = .16$) and *education* ($\beta = -.13$), remain most important in Table 5. The difference between New and Old Federal States is now overtaken completely by the explanatory power of other indicators in this regression. Furthermore, the different levels of ethnocentrism found in various *social milieus* (cf. Table 1) are reduced to a moderate effect for upper white collars ($r = -.23$, $\beta = -.03$, $p = .0779$). The size of the place in which respondents live is another structural distinction with significance. Inhabitants of larger towns tend to be more tolerant ($r = -.17$, $\beta = -.06$, $p = .0003$). Again the thesis that familiarity breeds contempt is not supported. We have already noted above that many large German cities have particularly high shares of foreigners.

All in all, a statement that socio-demographic differentiations have only moderate effects on ethnocentrism (*Küchler* 1996: 260) is not confirmed for Germany by our analysis of ALLBUS 1996. Further research will be needed to find out whether this divergence is caused by using different indicators of ethnocentrism or by differently refined indicators of socio-demographic characteristics in international data. We still have to admit that church membership or church attendance seem to be no correlates of ethnocentrism as far as our own analysis is concerned. If anything, right-winged Catholics are inclined towards ethnocentrism, but this effect can be omitted in a parsimonious model without losing much information. Nevertheless, additional investigations will show an interesting variant of this estimation in some respect (cf. below).

The general *left-right-ideology* is still indicatively attached with varying degrees of tolerance ($r = .29$, $\beta = .15$). Even though its bivariate correlation is even stronger, *postmaterialism* ($r = .37$, $\beta = .10$) seems to be surpassed at least a little by left-right in multivariate model after controlling for education, age and spending options. These *preferences for governmental spending* (defense, police, environment, old age pensions, culture and art) remain in the extended multivariate model with the defense question being in slight lead ($r = -.21$, $\beta = -.08$, $p = .0000$). Overall the signs of the effects are in accordance with assumptions about the positive correlation between postmaterialistic vs. materialistic preferences and level of ethnocentrism.

Table 5: Multiple Regression Analysis with ethnocentrism factor as dependent variable; (positive sign means estimation of higher ethnocentrism; ALLBUS 1996, results weighted to adjust the Eastern oversample)

	r	b	beta	t	p
Age	,38	,010	,16	9,109	,0000
Education	-,41	-,110	-,13	-6,584	,0000
Social milieu: Upper white collar	-,23	-,072	-,03	-1,764	,0779
Size of town	-,17	-,030	-,06	-3,629	,0003
Left-Right-Selfplacement	,29	,085	,15	9,689	,0000
Postmaterialism-Materialism	,37	,102	,10	6,088	,0000
Spending preference: Less defense	-,21	-,082	-,08	-4,910	,0000
Spending preference: Less police	-,24	-,042	-,04	-2,278	,0228
Spending preference: Less old age pensions	-,20	-,060	-,05	-2,991	,0028
Spending preference: Less environmental protection	,21	,063	,06	3,507	,0005
Spending preference: Less culture and art	,13	,062	,06	3,580	,0003
Contacts: Friendship or acquaintance	-,36	-,227	-,11	-6,472	,0000
Contacts: Working area	-,26	-,070	-,03	-2,069	,0386
Contacts: Family area	-,16	-,098	-,04	-2,375	,0176
Contacts: Neighborhood area	-,17	-,052	-,02	-1,506	,1321
Religious lessons: Islam should be taught	-,23	-,159	-,08	-4,344	,0000
Religious lessons: Only Christian lessons	,25	,146	,07	3,885	,0001
Assessment of personal economic situation	,13	,052	,04	2,464	,0138
Assessment of German economic situation	,14	,035	,03	1,780	,0752
Dissatisfaction with democracy	,16	,071	,07	4,261	,0000
Anomia: CARELESS POLITICIANS	,16	,123	,05	2,960	,0031
Anomia: NO CHILDREN	,23	,159	,08	4,810	,0000
Constant		-,906		-5,434	,0000

R = .63

R² = .40

Another strong reason for an improved acceptance of foreigners is perceived personal *friendship and acquaintance* ($r = -.36$, $\beta = -.11$). Contacts at work and in the family prove to be a little less important, while contacts in the neighborhood could even be discarded from this model ($r = -.17$, $\beta = -.02$, $p = .1321$). If we eliminated the contact items from the regression in Table 5, R would only drop from .63 to .62. Therefore, we may conclude that these indicators are not indispensable to reach a high multiple correlation.

Still significant is religious tolerance proposed for lessons in schools. Judged by strictly numerical criteria, approved *teaching of Islam* would be the predictor of fifth statistical

importance in building a complex model via stepwise regression, surpassed only by education, age, left-right and personal friendship. In the complex regression (Table 5) it still performs pretty well ($r=-.23$, $\beta=-.08$, $p=.0000$). A contrasting supplement is the restrictive demand for exclusive Christian lessons which is still in positive correlation with higher ethnocentrism ($r=.25$, $\beta=.07$, $p=.0001$).

Finally, we turn to the remaining indicators of economic dissatisfaction, political support and anomia. To some surprise the *subjective assessments of economy* still do not perform very well – with the opinions of the personal situation performing perhaps slightly better ($r=.13$, $\beta=.04$, $p=.0138$) than those of German economy in general ($r=.14$, $\beta=.03$, $p=.0752$). These economic interpretations are correlating at least moderately with discontents expressed about the democratic system ($r=.24$ and $r=.23$). *Political dissatisfaction* as a measurement of lacking diffuse political support remains a relevant correlate of ethnocentrism in Table 5 ($r=.16$, $\beta=.07$, $p=.0000$). Out of the four anomia items two have been retained in extended multivariate regression: CARELESS POLITICIANS and NO CHILDREN. The general anxiety about the future of our children is still more important ($r=.23$, $\beta=.08$, $p=.0000$) than the criticism of politicians ($r=.16$, $\beta=.05$, $p=.0000$). A connection between ethnocentrism and NO CHILDREN could even remind us of the lamentable catchphrase 'Das Boot ist voll!' (the boat is crowded) demanding more restriction on further immigration and on increase in population.

We shall finally turn to other economic assessments which we have not included in Table 5, either because of their irrelevance for our investigation or because of their close substantial relation with the dependent variable. Expectations about the future of the national and personal economy were also tested (cf. V115, V116 in ALLBUS 1996), but these proved to be almost irrelevant in our context. This finding is corroborated by the moderate influence which the economic expectation of a WORSE SITUATION for common people has shown above. What counts straightaway are *economic threats or costs directly ascribed to auslander* or *social envy* (cf. also *Durkheim* 1951; *Küchler* 1994, 1996; *Steußloff* 1997). Assumptions about foreigners taking away jobs, having bad influence on the housing market or encumbering our social security system are pretty relevant (ALLBUS 1996: V73, V75, V77). These somehow ethnocentric ascriptions raise the variation explained from 40% (cf. Table 5) to 52%. In a period marked by diffuse economic envies and by the weakness of a positive vision or encouraging metaphysics, foreigners are likely to be a target for more or less irrational blames growing out of real competition, vague fears and personal disappointments.

Discussion and extensions

In recent years, the climate of public opinion in Germany has changed notably. Some of the modifications concern political support, the relative importance of so-called materialistic values, economic fears and subjective social integration. Very often personal competence of politicians and other actors in our democracy are put into doubt, even though recent stages in this development should not be overemphasized (cf. *Parry* 1976; *Döring* 1990, 1992; *Terwey* and *Pollack* 1997). Nevertheless, it is likely that during phases of subjective dissatisfaction and disintegration certain social minorities (once again) will become a target of negative attributions. Actually, German survey data show a new increase of ethnic alienation. This tendency is yet not very strong, but it deserves close attention. Moreover, intercultural religious tolerance may also be considered to be deficient. While in the Old Federal States at least 40% of all respondents are in favor of teaching Islam in schools, there are only 12% to be found in Eastern Germany.

Objective income differences, social milieus and subjective assessments of economical situations may be considered as important sources of ethnocentrism, but the support we found for these assumptions was only moderate – at least after extended multivariate controls. However, if we put structural milieus and our two basic economic assessments into a simpler regression equation, they explain 10% of the variation in ethnocentrism. An additional larger part of explanation is mediated in this context by educational attainment. Education by itself explains just 5%, but adding education to the simpler regression including social milieus and subjective economic assessments raises the explanatory power from 10% to 23%.

The effect of *education* on ethnocentrism is pretty salient, but it cannot be easily interpreted: Educated people could be less ethnocentric because they have better opportunities to acquire an ethically positive view of our world (effects of '*Bildung*', *culture* or *erudition*), but one should also keep in mind that higher education increases the possibility of expressing socially accepted opinions (social desirability; cf. *Krebs* and *Schuessler* 1987). Anyhow, survey-responses according to social desirability would not completely devalue our findings about the strong impacts of education, as long as respondents do not consciously deceive.

Another explanation of the strong education-effect is that *inter-ethnic competition in the labor market* is probably less relevant for Germans with higher credentials. Additionally, the special contacts, which better-educated Germans use to have with foreigners, could often happen in advantaged *social settings* shared by similarly educated foreigners. This could lead to more favorable perceptions. We may conclude that at least some important social circumstances of interaction have been controlled in our models (social milieu, community size, age, factual contacts reported in different contexts). A large part of social

class segmentation is partialled out before estimating the multivariate education effect in Table 5. Hence, we feel confident to some extent that a potency of higher education to reduce ethnocentrism is confirmed. Enlightenment via education with its correlates of adopting human rights is ascertained in this investigation.

Neither the ethnocentric traits of the Old Testament, nor the more benevolent compassion of the New Testament have prevailed very much amongst the majority of church members in unified Germany. Only minor differences appear between more or less conservative Christians. This general finding is quite contrary to official declarations about the Christians' stewardship for the weak and the poor. It diverges from some public actions as the 'Kirchenasyl' for particular foreign families whose remigration is proposed by political officials. In general, many contemporary mainstream Christians seem to be at least a little half-hearted about people from abroad. Those dogmatics who have a preference for exclusive Christian lessons in school show a clear tendency towards higher ethnocentrism.

A remarkable correlation between ethnocentrism and anomia was found for political alienation or lack of efficacy, as measured by CARELESS POLITICIANS, and for an existential pessimism which is expressed in the assumption that it is better to have NO CHILDREN any more. If we run *separate regressions for East and West Germany* the effects of anomia prove to be even more important in the New Federal States. The breakdown of socialist communities and the far-reaching transformation after socialism has enhanced social disintegration. Noticing that NO CHILDREN is a rather significant attitudinal correlate of ethnocentrism in East Germany, we may also recall that the basic pessimism stated through this anomia-item has particularly increased in the New Federal States (cf. Chart 4).

Another important information about church is also revealed by using such separate regressions for the Old and New Federal States. Church attendants in the East are slightly less ethnocentric than their more secularized counterparts. Furthermore, the very strong effect of age on ethnocentrism is differentiated in separate regressions. (East: $r=.27$; West: $r=.40$). Nevertheless, age is still one of the strongest predictors of ethnocentrism in the New Federal States (same variable used as listed in Table 5).

The details and determinants of these particular differences between both parts of Germany remain to be described in future research. As *McCutcheon* (1998) has come to some similar conclusions, using different models and indicators of ethnocentrism, the dissimilarities between the Eastern and Western Christians cannot be considered as simply spurious. They will deserve closer inspection. At least amongst the strongly diminished community of Eastern Christians tolerance seems to be fostered. Anyhow, ethnic adversities in larger parts of the West German population could still turn out worse (e.g. amongst older Germans), if the traditional churches would completely disappear from the social scene.

The notion of a basic worldview or 'Weltanschauung' designates a personal set of elementary, global interpretations concerning sense, potentials and the social sphere a person is part of. In general, 'Weltanschauung' constitutes a somewhat metaphysical reduction of a complex social reality, but it also adds some complexity, because it is always a changing selection and *supplement* of the assumed 'objective truth' (cf. the concept of 'supplément' in French sociology). Subjective views about an appropriate level of material subsistence influence priorities and identifications for some persons, while others would rather free themselves from further striving for such external objects. It may be accepted as a standard that some aspects in reality or very special identifications are preferred to establish a 'Weltanschauung', while others are neglected. As far as ethnocentric tendencies of viewing our world or dealing with it are firmly anchored in certain social groups, or in important individual characteristics, they have to be considered as consequential and integral parts of our social reality.

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